Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients by Carle, Susan D.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 70 Issue 3 Article 4 
2001 
Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients 
Susan D. Carle 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 719 (2001). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients 
Cover Page Footnote 
Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. The thoughts in this Article 
grew out of a series of panel discussions on topics related to public interest lawyering held at Washington 
College of Law in the spring semesters of 2000 and 2001, made possible through Dean Claudio 
Grossman's generous support and funding. I wish to thank all of the participants in those events for 
stimulating presentations. I am especially indebted to Professors Richard Wilson and Richard Abel, and F. 
Paul Bland of the Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, from whose talks I have borrowed ideas for this Article. 
Sheila Siegal of the National Association of Public Interest Law generously provided informaiton. I was 
also very fortunate to receive enormously helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article from four of 
my colleagues who have been at the forefront in developing the "client-centered" lawyering theory: Robert 
Dinerstein, Binny Miller, Elliot Milstein, and Richard Wilson (though I fear I persuaded none of them of my 
point). Piper Nieters provided valuable research assistance. The ideas in this Article are influenced by my 
prior practice experience as a union-side labory lawyer, reflections on my professional socialization 
process at Yale Law School in the mid-1980s, and interactions over the past five years of teaching at WCL 
with many outstanding students struggling with the challenges of finding meaningful careers in law. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol70/iss3/4 
RE-VALUING LAWYERING FOR MIDDLE-
INCOME CLIENTS
Susan D. Carle*
INTRODUCTION
In this short Article I argue that we should assign more honor to
lawyering for middle-income clients. By this I mean that we should
hold in esteem careers involving lawyering for middle-income clients
in much the same way we currently value careers in what is often
referred to as "public interest" law. Instead of conceiving of a binary
distinction between "public" and "private" interest law, we should
think about jobs in the legal profession as falling on a spectrum, along
which the public service dimension of a legal position is inversely
related to the wealth and power of one's clients. Thus, my proposed
model would see more value in representing poor people than middle-
income clients, but would also see more value in representing middle-
income clients than wealthy and powerful ones, especially when one is
representing middle-income clients against more powerful interests.
This model, if adopted as an alternative prestige hierarchy among
even a small group of the nation's law students, could have important
benefits in steering the many socially committed students who do not
secure traditional "public interest" jobs to law practice settings other
than large law firms representing the nation's most powerful and
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wealthy interests. At the same time, it would increase the quality and
availability of legal services for middle-income clients.
I. A LACK OF ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION FOR MIDDLE-INCOME
CLIENTS?
Increasing numbers of legal commentators are turning their
attention to the question of whether middle-income clients have
adequate access to legal representation. That question, indeed, is at
the very heart of the issues addressed by this Symposium. It is,
however, a difficult one to answer because the evidence points in
somewhat contradictory directions. What is certainly undeniable-
and sufficient for purposes of my argument-is that middle-income
persons receive far less and lower quality legal services than do
powerful and wealthy corporate clients. That fact is sufficient in itself
to cause concern about whether the interests of the majority of
Americans that make up the "middle class" are sufficiently
represented in the legal process, and about the long term
consequences of such an imbalance in the quality of legal
representation on United States public policy.
A. Who is "Middle Class"?
Since the theme of this Symposium is "Lawyering for the Middle
Class," I must address as a preliminary matter the definition of the
term "middle class." In the United States, as in many societies,
"class" is a heavily loaded term. Indeed, much of the difficulty I
discuss below concerning how to characterize the social value of
lawyering for the "middle class" undoubtedly stems from the many
evocative connotations of this term.' Our ideas about class typically
contain a host of bundled assumptions about how members lead their
lives, the problems they face, and the values they share.2 One
commentator, for example, defines the middle class as those who have
reached a certain educational level (usually at least a high school
diploma), and who have health insurance, access to credit, confidence
in their opportunities for economic advancement, and a commitment
to saving and investing.' Note how, under such a definition, the very
1. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and
Caveats, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1847, 1854-55, 1869-94 (1996) (defining class as "a structured
system of inequality" and exploring various definitions based on wealth, occupation,
consumption, and extra-economic characteristics).
2. See generally Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment
of Taste (Richard Nice trans., Harv. U. Press 1984) (discussing the way class position
infuses value judgments about matters as diverse as politics, food, art, and home
furnishings).
3. Toni Horst, Membership in the Middle Class, at
http://www.dismal.com/todays econ./te-012301_2.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2001); see
also U.S. Census Bureau, Income Inequality (Middle Class), at http://www.census.gov/
hhes/income/midclass/midclsan.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2001) (explaining use of
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term "middle class" connotes that group of Americans for whom the
economic and political system is supposedly working. As I discuss
below, however, a closer look at economic facts may belie the
assumption that all is basically well for the middle class.
Demographers use a simpler and more literal definition of "middle
class." They typically define "middle class" as those persons living in
households with annual incomes clustering around the median
household income Under this definition, the "poor" are the 20% of
the population with the lowest household income (up to
approximately $17,000 in 1999). The "middle" class are the next three
quintiles-i.e., the second quintile or "lower middle" class, with
household incomes up to approximately $32,000 in 1999; the third
quintile or "mathematical middle," with household incomes up to
approximately $51,000 in 1999; and the fourth quintile, or "upper"
middle class, with household incomes of up to approximately $79,000
in 1999. 5 This leaves the highest quintile as the "upper class," i.e., the
top 20% of the population, which, astoundingly enough, earns almost
50% of all income.6
The income-based definition described above fails to take into
account important variables such as living expenses, assets, and
debts-all of which play a key role in determining actual financial
security. Nevertheless, because of its simplicity and wide usage, the
demographers' definition is the one I will use here. And since this is
the definition I am employing, I will use the term "middle income"
rather than "middle class" throughout this Article. In so doing I am
referring to the middle 60% of the American population, living on
annual household incomes of between $17,000 and $79,000 in 1999.
The income range for the middle class is far lower than many
people assume.7 The fact is that the majority of Americans live on
quite modest incomes and lack the discretionary spending power
necessary to purchase expensive legal services in today's market. But
quintile system to define middle class).
4. In 1999, the median household income was $40,816 per year. U.S. Census
Bureau, Current Population Reports, P60-209, Money Income in the United States:
1999, at x (2000).
5. Tom Zeller, Calculating One Kind of Middle Class. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 2000,
§ 4 (Magazine), at 5; see also U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 4, at xii (updating
figures for 1999).
6. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 4, at xii.
7. Indeed, studies show that many upper-income Americans identify themselves
as middle class even though their incomes far exceed this classification. See, e.g., Dan
Radmacher, 'Middle Class' Poorer Than Thought, Charleston Gazette. Mar. 16,2001.
at A4. Newt Gringrich, for example, defined "middle class" as families with incomes
of up to $200,000 per year, while Republican Congressman Fred Heineman defined
"middle class" as those making between $300,000 and $750,000. S.M. Miller, Class
Dismissed?, Am. Prospect, Mar. 21, 1995, at http'Jvww.prospect.orglprintlV6r21
miller-s.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2001); Sam Roberts, Another Kind of Middle-Class
Squeeze, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1997, § 4 (Magazine), at 1.
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whether middle-income persons receive "good enough" legal
representation in today's legal market is a more complicated question.
B. Do Middle- Income Persons Receive Adequate Legal
Representation?
The evidence is mixed on the key question of whether middle-
income persons receive adequate legal representation in today's legal
services market. On the one hand, demographic statistics indicate
that the majority of American lawyers make their living in solo or
small firm practices, and that the typical clients in this practice sector
are nonwealthy individuals. According to the latest statistics, of the
74% of U.S. lawyers who were in private practice in 1995 (up from
68% in 1980), fully 47% were solo practitioners, compared to 49% in
1980 and 64% in 1960.8 Of the nation's law firms, 42% are made up of
ten or fewer lawyers. 9 The data further suggest that these solo and
small firm practitioners predominantly represent individual clients in
"personal plight" matters.10 These demographic statistics thus evoke
images of a large cadre of lawyers available to assist middle-income
individuals with their typical legal needs, especially in lucrative areas
such as contingency fee-based plaintiffs' personal injury work.
Lawyers also represent middle-class interests on the other side of
these cases by handling defense work for the insurance companies
responsible for covering the potential legal liabilities of middle-
income drivers and home owners. Lawyers who are qualified to
prepare simple wills and handle routine estate planning likewise seem
plentifully represented in the large group of solo and small firm
practitioners just described. Labor unions attempt to protect the
employment-related rights of the American work force, and
increasing numbers of employers, unionized or not, offer low-cost,
pre-paid legal service plans as part of their employee benefits
packages. Finally, franchise law firms catering to middle-income
clients, such as Jacoby & Myers and Hyatt Legal Services, were
burgeoning in middle-income communities only a short time ago.
Thus, at least on the surface, legal services for middle-income clients
would appear to be sufficient.
8. Clara N. Carson, Am. B. Found., The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S.
Legal Profession in 1995, at 7, 24 (2000); see also Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of
American Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing
Society, 44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 345, 391 (1994) (providing additional comparative
statistics).
9. Carson, supra note 8, at 8. Thus, the common impression that most lawyers
work in large firms is something of an illusion, created by the much greater visibility
and power of lawyers in these practices. In fact, only 23% of U.S. lawyers work in
firms of more than 100 lawyers. Id.
10. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 202-03 (1989) (summarizing the literature
on correlation between practice size and client type).
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Beneath the surface, the picture of whether middle-income
individuals receive adequate legal representation is far more murky.
A growing body of literature questions the quality of the legal services
available to middle-income clients, in personal injury as well as other
practice areas." Labor unions today represent only a tiny sliver of the
American work force.'2 The franchise law firm movement appears to
be facing serious financial difficulties: Jacoby & Meyers has dissolved
and Hyatt Legal Services has shrunk dramatically. 3 Many other so-
called legal clinics have decided to concentrate almost exclusively on
personal injury work. 4
Survey research seeking to measure the availability of legal services
to various income populations casts further doubt on the common
impression that middle-income populations are adequately served in
today's legal market. This research suggests that middle- and low-
income clients are more similarly situated with respect to the
availability of adequate legal representation than might be supposed.
The best known of these research projects is a 1993 survey conducted
by the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Consortium on Legal
Services and the Public."' Using the same income percentiles to define
"low-" and "moderate-income" households as those I offered above
for the "poor" and "middle income" categories, the researchers
conducting this survey concluded that existing provider arrangements
were failing to meet the legal needs of both low- and moderate-
income groups, emphasizing that "[w]hat is most striking is the
similarity in the profiles of the legal needs of the two income
groups."'6 These researchers further reported that, "for both low- and
moderate-income households, the most frequent response when
facing a situation having legal implications was to attempt to deal with
11. See, e.g.. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans,
44 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 531 (1994) (questioning quality of legal services delivered to
"ordinary Americans"); see also Jonathan Harr, A Civil Action 66 (1995) (describing
plaintiffs' personal injury law firm's practice of letting less promising cases -die
quietly in the files").
12. See Cases and Materials on Labor Law 1018 (A. Cox et al. eds., 13th ed. 2001)
(noting that less than 10% of private sector employees are unionized).
13. Maryland Moderate Income Access to Justice Advisory Taskforce,
Preliminary Report and Preliminary Recommendations on the Unmet Legal Needs of
Moderate Income Persons in Maryland, June 11, 1996, at 20-21 & nn.11-12
(unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author) (citing Mike France, Legal Clinics:
Lights Go Out for Storefronts, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 12, 1994, at Al, and New York State
Bar Commission on Providing Access to Legal Services for Middle Income
Consumers, Report and Recommendations to the House of Delegates 1, 4-5 (Apr.
1996)).
14. Id.
15. The survey defined "low-income" persons as those in the bottom income
quintile (i.e., the lowest 20%) and "moderate-income" persons to cover the next three
quintiles. ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Legal Needs and Civil
Justice: A Survey of Americans: Major Findings from the Comprehensive Legal
Needs Study 1 (1994) [hereinafter Major Findings of ABA Legal Needs Survey].
16. Id. at 5.
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the matter on their own," and that "nearly three fourths of the legal
needs of low-income households and nearly two thirds of legal needs
of moderate-income households were not taken into the civil justice
system in 1992. ' 17
Surveys of legal needs in a number of states have reached similar
conclusions. In 1996, the Maryland State Bar Association's Moderate
Income Access to Justice Advisory Task Force, administered by
Professor Michael A. Millemann of the University of Maryland Law
School, conducted a legal needs survey which found that "72 percent
of Maryland's middle-class citizens... no longer contact a lawyer
when faced with a legal problem" and that "[c]ost is a major factor" in
this phenomenon. 8 Such evidence has led many experts across the
country to call for greater recognition of a crisis in the provision of
legal services to middle-income populations.' 9
Other experts have leveled valid criticisms, on various grounds,
against such attempts to measure legal needs through survey research.
These grounds include failure to recognize the way in which legal
needs are "socially constructed" and omission of harms that require
collective or structural solutions (e.g. environmental harms) from the
list of legal needs surveyed.20  But even with these limitations, the
survey data provide a starting point, suggesting that middle-income
persons face significant and growing problems of access to the legal
system.
17. Id. at 12; see also ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public, Agenda
for Access: The American People and Civil Justice: Final Report on the Implications
of the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 4-5 (1996) [hereinafter ABA Final Report]
(presenting the same information in graph form). An earlier comprehensive survey
reached similar findings. See generally Barbara A. Curran, The Legal Needs of the
Public: The Final Report of a National Survey (1977). I focus on the 1993 results
since they are the most recent.
18. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Is Middle Class America Denied Access to Justice?, 29
Md. B.J. 44, 45 (1996). Professor Millemann's Maryland task force proposed
establishing a private network of attorneys, "rather than public funding, to enhance
middle-class access to the justice system," and called on law schools to expand
coverage of substantive law, ethics, and practice management issues related to
providing legal services to middle-income constituencies through such private
provider arrangements. Id. at 47.
19. See, e.g., Cramton, supra note 11, at 541-62 (describing evidence of lack of
legal services of adequate quality for "ordinary Americans"); Alan W. Houseman,
Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First Century: Achieving Equal Justice for All, 17
Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 369 (1998) (discussing how a number of leaders in the civil legal-
assistance movement have recently suggested that legal-services programs should
serve both the very poor and those with moderate incomes); Hon. Denise R. Johnson,
The Legal Needs of the Poor as a Starting Point for Systemic Reform, 17 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 479, 480, 483-84 (1998) (providing sitting family court judge's observations
concerning lack of access to justice by, and resulting legal problems of, persons of
both moderate and low income levels).
20. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional Reform, 45 Md. L.
Rev. 274, 281-82 (1986) (noting problematic nature of legal needs surveys and citing
other critiques).
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Other data point to growing similarities between low- and middle-
income persons, especially in relation to both groups' economic
instability. Research conducted in the 1990s shows that the line
between being middle and low income is far more tenuous than might
be supposed. A growing middle-income debt crisis means that many
apparently middle-income persons who lack substantial family assets
or other backup sources of financial support are separated from
poverty by only a few paychecks.2' High rates of divorce and family
dissolution continue to have catastrophic financial consequences for
many women and children, so that women and children in the middle-
income category frequently find themselves falling into poverty after
divorce.' Nor are middle-income men necessarily secure in their
financial status. Research on economic dislocation in the 1990s
documents an "income squeeze" in the male occupational sector, as
more jobs become concentrated in the top and bottom of the income
scale and fewer jobs remain "in the middle for those with modest
educational attainments."'  Indeed, this growing tendency for
substantial movement of individuals between the low and middle
income categories was one of the many reasons the ABA Legal Needs
Survey report so strongly argued against a "dual conception of the
legal needs of low- and moderate-income households."2'
In sum, once our standard assumptions about whether the legal
system is working for middle-income Americans are tested against
current economic and survey data, our sense that the legal system is
working "well enough" for most middle-income persons becomes far
less certain. Available evidence shows that the line between low- and
middle-income persons, and the divergence in their legal interests and
problems of access to the legal system, are in many respects far less
than might be supposed. At the very least, what is clear is that the
legal interests of wealthy and powerful clients, especially corporate
21. See Teresa A. Sullivan et al., The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt
113-14 (2000) (discussing high debt burdens as a cause of the growing inability of
middle-class persons to weather crises such as unemployment or illness).
22. See Katherine S. Newman, Falling from Grace: The Experience of Downward
Mobility in the American Middle Class 202-28 (1988) (discussing adverse financial
consequences of divorce on middle-class women and children). The prevailing
wisdom used to be that a man's standard of living was likely to improve after divorce,
see id at 202 (citation omitted), but recent research suggests that men's economic
standing may also be rendered more precarious by divorce. See Sullivan et al., supra
note 21, at 241 (stating that "most researchers agree that divorce has serious financial
consequences for men and women").
23. Sullivan et al., supra note 21, at 31; see also Thomas L McMahon et al.,
Hollow in the Middle: The Rise and Fall of New York City's Middle Class (1997),
available at http://vww.council.nyc.ny.us/finance/middleclass.htm (last visited Aug. 14.
2001) (documenting declining share of income received by previously middle-income
households in New York City as a result of changes in City's economic and social
structure).
24. ABA Final Report, supra note 17, at 25.
2001] 725
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entities, are receiving far more and far better legal representation than
are those of individual clients of modest financial means.
Given the large number of lawyers who represent middle-income
clients, it is disturbing that the majority of individual Americans face
problems of inadequate quality in legal representation. Part of the
problem, of course, lies in the stark fact of vast differentials in
financial resources-it is always easier to buy high quality professional
services if one can pay huge amounts for them. But that is not the
whole explanation. Doctors, for example (working in a very
differently organized profession, to be sure), readily provide quality
care to both wealthy and middle-income clients. I argue below that
another key part of the problem is the existence in the legal profession
of a dominant status hierarchy that defines lawyering for middle-
income clients as a low-prestige career path.
II. PRESTIGE HIERARCHIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
This section investigates two status hierarchies that exist in the legal
profession: a dominant hierarchy that defines lawyering for corporate
clients as the highest prestige career and lawyering for individuals as a
low prestige track; and an alternative hierarchy that assigns honor to
lawyers who do what is defined as "public interest" work, but excludes
lawyering for middle-income clients from this rubric. These
hierarchies, working together, contribute to the devaluation of the
work of lawyers who represent middle-income clients, and thus
perpetuate conditions that fail to recognize lawyers who carry out the
legal profession's core function of helping real people with real
problems and thus provide "access to justice" to the majority of
Americans.'
A. The Dominant Prestige Hierarchy
The classic study of the legal profession's dominant status hierarchy
is John Heinz and Edward Laumann's Chicago Lawyers.6 Heinz and
Laumann set out to explore a number of questions about the Chicago
bar's organization, but over the course of their study began to focus
on a thesis that emphasized the division of the bar into two distinct
"hemispheres."27  One of those spheres consisted of lawyers who
represented corporations and other large organizations and their top
representatives. Lawyers who worked in this sphere had high social
prestige. The other sphere consisted of lawyers whose practices
25. I take this phrase from the series of conferences Professor Elliott Milstein
organized on this topic across the country during his term as President of the
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") in 2000-2001.
26. John P. Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure
of the Bar (Northwestern Univ. Press/Am. B. Found. 1994) (1982).
27. Id. at 127-36.
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primarily involved representing individuals. This sphere had lower
prestige. Heinz and Laumann found that lawyers working for higher
prestige firms representing large organizations tended to have been
recruited from more elite schools, made more money, and generally
came from different socioeconomic and ethno-religious backgrounds.
They maintained professional and social contacts predominantly
within their own professional status group and had greater access to
powerful figures in the community.
The dominant status hierarchy in the profession, in other words,
privileges work for corporations and de-privileges work for individual
clients. This status hierarchy is perpetuated in many ways. One is the
frequently invoked claim that "the best" lawyers prefer corporate law
work because individual client representation is not as "interesting" as
the "sophisticated" work corporate lawyers do. This idea is a classic
illustration of how prestige hierarchies are socially constructed
through the transmission of subtle but powerful messages across
professional generations.' No neutral standard of judgment compels
the conclusion that corporate law is intrinsically more "interesting"
than other fields. 9 To a lawyer who has been trained to appreciate
the complexity of her role, there are a host of fascinating, complex
issues involved in most client representations.' Nor is it necessarily
true that work for individual clients is by definition not sophisticated
or complex from the perspective of procedural or substantive law.
Plaintiffs' lawyers are, after all, on the opposite side of the same
complex litigation that corporate defense lawyers are handling, in a
host of areas including products liability, labor, pension, and
employment law. Moreover, plaintiffs' law firms typically staff cases
far more thinly than large corporate law firms do, so that plaintiffs'
28. This is certainly a claim I heard my professors make when I was a student at
Yale Law School in the mid-1980s. Cf Robert V. Stover. Making It and Breaking It:
The Fate of Public Interest Commitment during Law School 77-79 (1989) (reporting
his finding that the practicing bar played larger role in conveying this message than
did law faculty, but noting arguments to the contrary (citing Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education as Training for Hierarchy, in The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique
51-52 (David Kairys ed., 1982))).
29. Indeed, many of my law students report that they find courses such as criminal
law, tort law, and family and matrimonial law, in which they read cases involving
individuals' life dramas, much more interesting than corporate law. It seems to me
that these students are unlikely to find corporate law fascinating in practice if they
disliked the subject in law school, as I sometimes point out to them. I think we could
find many opportunities to invite students to reflect more seriously on what areas of
law they find most engaging, not only through clinical and legal ethics teaching but
also through the substantive law curriculum. It is worth noting, for example, that case
books often use engaging cases involving ordinary individuals' legal problems to
illustrate developments in legal doctrine.
30. This is one of the great insights of the clinical education movement. See, e.g.,
Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts: Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 109 (1993) (discussing student supervision techniques
designed to encourage reflection about the complexities of client representation).
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lawyers typically bear greater responsibility, much earlier in their
careers, than do their large firm counterparts.
To be sure, some of the work lawyers perform for individual clients
is routine. Studies of lawyers in the individual client sector frequently
emphasize this point. 1 But such studies are not comparative; they do
not measure the extent to which the same can be said for corporate
law work. Indeed, researchers studying lawyers who work for large
corporate law firms provide similar reports of miserable lawyers
chained by golden handcuffs to jobs they do not enjoy.32 The problem
of lawyer dissatisfaction thus is not confined to one or the other of the
Heinz and Laumann hemispheres. Although large firm lawyers do
enjoy significant quality of work life advantages on tangible matters
such as availability of resources and access to power,3 judgments
about what legal work is "interesting" involve intangibles heavily
laden with socially constructed values.
31. See, e.g., Jerry Van Hoy, Franchise Law Firms and the Transformation of
Personal Legal Services 77 (1997) (citing literature on this point).
32. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal
Profession 11 (2000) ("'Doing litigation' in the style to which junior attorneys have
become accustomed often means endless cycles of scut work."); William C. Kelley,
Jr., Reflection on Lawyer Morale and Public Service in An Age of Diminishing
Expectations, in The Law Firm and the Public Good 90 (Robert A. Katzmann ed.,
1995) (discussing sources of large-firm lawyer discontent); see also Wendy R.
Leibowitz, The New Fatalism, Am. Law., Oct. 1994, at 7 (reporting on mid-level
associates' "misery" in large law firms); David H. Maister, The Missing Element: Fun,
Conn. L. Trib., July 11, 1994, at 25 (discussing partners' dissatisfaction with large law
firm practice); Ruth Marcus, New Lawyers Grab Big Bucks, Bergen Rec., June 14,
1987, at 1 (describing corporate law firm life in New York City: "[T]he hours are
brutal. The work can be deadly dull, poring over stacks of documents; researching
obscure points of law for briefs that more senior lawyers will write; spending late
nights at the printers' proofreading prospectuses."); Scott Olson, Majority Would
Consider Job Changes, Indianapolis Bus. J., Jan. 29, 2001, at 3 (reporting on ABA
survey finding that: "The most obvious sign of dissatisfaction came from those
attorneys at law firms with at least 200 attorneys, in which more than 80 percent
indicated they might leave their position in the next two years. In contrast, 57 percent
of lawyers at firms with no more than four attorneys feel the same disgruntlement.").
33. Thus I do not mean to paint an overly rosy view of solo and small firm life.
Studies of such practices reveal many problems, including financial stress (especially
stress related to income fluctuation and variable cash flow, as is typical of many small
businesses) and increasing competitive pressures forcing lawyers to give less
individualized attention to clients. See, e.g., Caroll Seron, The Business of Practicing
Law: The Work Lives of Solo and Small-Firm Lawyers 16 (1996); Jerry Van Hoy,
supra note 31, at 14-15, 26-50. Van Hoy reports that franchise law firms delegate
down to the paralegal level or lower as much work as possible. This is a problem that
need not necessarily lead to lawyer dissatisfaction-indeed, to my mind it should have
the opposite effect-but Van Hoy reports it as one of many negative features
described by lawyers in the field. An unanswered question, though, is whether some
of the problems with lawyer satisfaction may be at least partially attributable to a
status hierarchy that defines these positions as jobs of last resort, see id. at 88-90, so
that the field may attract lawyers who are unlikely to enjoy the kinds of highly
detailed, sometimes tedious, work required of lawyers in a great many settings.
[Vol. 70
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B. An Alternative Hierarchy: "Public Interest" Law
There is an alternative prestige hierarchy in the profession,
especially at many law schools, that confers special honor to some
alternative careers focused on helping people in need who cannot pay
for legal representation. The label generally assigned to the kinds of
careers that are valued in this sense is "public interest" law. That
term, very much like the term "middle class," is enormously
overloaded with evocative connotations and layers of history, as I will
discuss below.
Today, people use the term "public interest" law as a gloss for a
wide range of sometimes contradictory lawyering categories. Some
people define "public interest" law as lawyering for the poor.-' Some
define it as "cause" lawyering. s Others think of it as lawyering
specifically with a left wing or politically progressive agenda. Still
others define the term as encompassing jobs in the public and
nonprofit sectors.37 This last definition equates "public interest" law
with law practiced in organizational forms in which lawyers do not
take fees for their legal services from their clients. Indeed, as I will
discuss further from an historical perspective, the assumption that
"public interest" law involves lawyering in arrangements funded
through means other than client-paid fees is a strong but virtually
unexamined precept in many "public interest" circles. There is,
however, no principled basis for this requirement, which tends to
exclude from recognition the many lawyers throughout our history
who, while organized in "private" law practice arrangements, have
worked on the same kinds of legal issues as "public interest" lawyers.3
34. See, e.g., Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the
Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 Yale LJ. 1005, 1006-07
(1970) (arguing that public interest law should confine itself to representing the poor
and disenfranchised). The Cahns' view is discussed in greater detail below. See infra
notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Layvering and the
Reproduction of Professional Authority: An Introduction, in Cause Lawyering:
Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities 3-16 (A. Sarat & S.
Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter Cause Lawyering] (discussing the complexity of
defining cause lawyering).
36. See, e.g., David R. Esquivel, Note, The Identity Crisis in Public Interest Law,
46 Duke L.J. 327, 348-50 (1996) (arguing that public interest lawyers are usually
committed to a substantive vision of where society should be headed).
37. See, e.g., National Association for Law Placement, Jobs & J.D.'s: Employment
and Salaries of New Law Graduates-Class of 2000, at 109 (2001) (defining public
interest employment as "positions funded by the Legal Services Corporation and
others providing civil legal services as well as positions with private non-profit
advocacy or cause-oriented organizations.... non-profit policy analysis and research
organizations and public defenders").
38. Cf Louise Trubek & M. Elizabeth Kransberger, Critical Lawyers: Social
Justice and the Structures of Private Practice, in Cause Lawyering, supra note 35, at
201, 202-03 (critiquing "bright line" distinction between public interest and private
sector practice from the perspective of finding innovative approaches in poverty law).
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The very use of language to divide up the world of law practice into
"public" and "private" spheres renders invisible the contributions of
such lawyers.39
The most commonly cited definition of "public interest" law
attempts to dodge the problems inherent in the approaches mentioned
above by offering a neutral, "catch-all" definition. This definition
conceives of "public interest" lawyering as lawyering for "under-
represented" interests, thus seeking to avoid value judgments about
what interests are worthy of being represented. The Council for
Public Interest Law states:
Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts
to provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups
and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in recognition that
the ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide such
services to significant segments of the population and to significant
interests. Such groups and interests include the poor,
environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and
others.40
Many leading public interest advocates have adopted this definition,
equating public interest lawyering with lawyering for interests that
lack adequate representation in the legal process.4'
This definition, in my view, best fits with contemporary notions of
interest group pluralism. Interest group pluralism holds that no class
or interest group in our society necessarily has the upper hand in
discerning the "public interest," but that better public policy is made
to the extent that all affected constituencies are given a voice in the
processes through which public policies are made. Lawyers who
39. Joel Handler and his co-authors provide an example of such erasure in their
study of the career paths of legal services lawyers. Investigating the commonly held
notion that most legal services lawyers end up renouncing their commitments to social
justice by going into private practice, Handler discovered that what was actually
happening was that:
some young [former legal services] lawyers have chosen not affiliation with
traditional law firms, but a practice with more of a mix of working class,
poor people, and minorities.... Their path is working at the community
level, helping the lower classes with their problems, and gradually building
strength at the local level. Some lawyers have articulated this view; others
have chosen this style of practice as a matter of taste. They are unwilling to
sell their professional careers to the upper classes.
Joel F. Handler et al., Lawyers and the Pursuit of Legal Rights 11-12 (1978); see also
id. at 156-65 (summarizing these findings in more detail).
40. Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing
Public Interest Law in America 6-7 (1976); see also Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R.
6.1 (2001) (using similar concept focusing on under-representation to define interests
to whom lawyers owe a pro bono obligation).
41. See, e.g., Nan Aron, Liberty and Justice for All 4 (1989); see also Stephen
Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective
Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 Va. L. Rev.
1103,1106 & n.9 (1992).
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subscribe to this view of "public interest" lawyering recognize that
they are not representing the "public interest" per se in serving as
advocates for under-represented clients, but that, by zealously
representing the private interests of members of such client groups,
they are helping in the end to advance the public interest by ensuring
that all affected voices are heard.
This, indeed, is one of the central insights of the client-centered
lawyering movement in clinical education. Theorists of this approach
advocate a strong focus on zealously representing the interests of poor
and disenfranchised clients as those clients define those interests.2 This
literature thus provides an important breakthrough in clarifying the
difference between lawyer-centered conceptions of "public interest"
lawyering-i.e., those in which lawyers decide on an agenda and then
find ostensible clients through which to promote it-and client-
centered conceptions that seek to work with clients to ascertain,
clarify, and promote under-represented clients' self-defined interests.
But the use of the term "public interest" to capture such ideas as
client-centered lawyering for under-represented interests is puzzling:
if this is what we mean by "public interest" lawyering, why do we not
simply use the term "under-representation" lawyering? And if we
mean "under-representation" lawyering when we use the term "public
interest" lawyering, why do we often hesitate to include in our idea of
"public interest" lawyering the work of lawyers who provide legal
services in modest fee-for-service arrangements to middle-income
clients in areas where there appear to be significant problems of
under-representation?43 These creative, fee-based projects often do
42. My thanks to Elliott Milstein for talking through this point with me. For
leading scholarship on client-centered lawyering, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-
Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 501 (1990); Robert
D. Dinerstein, Clinical Scholarship and the Justice Mission, 40 Clev. St. L Rev. 469,
471 (1992); Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L Rev. 697,
702-18 (1992); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 485 (1994); Lucie E. White. Subordination,
Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
43. Here I am thinking, inter alia, of union-side labor law, plaintiffs' employment
discrimination firms, and criminal defense practices for nonwealthy defendants. See,
e.g., Michael J. Kelly. Lives of Lawyers: Journeys in the Organizations of Practice 145-
63 (1994) (analyzing struggles of criminal and civil rights practices); Debra S. Katz &
Lynne Bernabei, Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private Public Interest Law Firm:
The Ideal Setting to Challenge the Power, 96 W. Va. L. Rev. 293 (1993-94) (describing
plaintiffs' side employment law firm). A host of other innovative "fee-for-service"
arrangements also fall in this category. One is the Law School Consortium Project,
aimed at supporting solo and small-firm lawyers in order to help them meet the legal
needs of low- and moderate-income individuals and communities. Recognizing the
"crucial role private practitioners play in the provision of legal services." this project
provides a host of resources, including networking. referrals, mentoring, technology
and management training, and community outreach projects. See Law School
Consortium Project Description at http'J/wwwv.lavschoolconsortium.net (last visited
Aug. 14,2001).
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not seem to make it onto our students' radar screens as they search for
socially meaningful career options in law. One wonders why we do
not bring in lawyers such as these, who are creatively pioneering ways
of combining a paying practice with "doing social justice," to speak in
our classes and be held up for honor, rather than continuing to
applaud the usual, highly visible, large and powerful firms for
establishing pro bono departments that do minuscule amounts of
public interest work while bringing in huge revenue defending the
nation's wealthiest interests? If anything, the taking of modest fees
suggests that lawyers might be more disciplined in representing
clients' self-defined interests. I suggest below that layers of concealed
history underlie our continued use of the phrase "public interest"
lawyering ostensibly to refer to "under-representation" lawyering.
C. Some History Underlying the Concept of "Public Interest" Law
This section explores some of the history that explains why "public
interest" law has come to be understood as excluding the
representation of middle-income interests in modest fee-for-service
arrangements. I will focus on two historical periods in which
conceptions of "public interest" lawyering were actively debated: the
early twentieth century, sometimes referred to as the Progressive Era
(circa 1890-1920), and the 1970s "public interest" lawyering
movement. In both those periods, the dominant conception of "public
interest" law ignored the importance of fee-for-service models.
The American Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") is another pioneer
in conceiving of creative new ways to provide legal services at moderate cost to
middle-income persons. One AARP program involves "unbundling" legal services,
so that consumers can purchase for moderate fees discrete tasks from a network of
carefully screened lawyers. See Wayne Moore & Monica Kolasa, Legal Services
Delivery Model: AARP's Legal Services Network: Expanding Legal Services to the
Middle Class, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 503, 507-08 (1997); see also Forrest S. Mosten,
ABA Law Practice Management Section, Unbundling Legal Services (2000)
(describing initiatives to lower cost of legal services by separating out discrete tasks
for which lawyer's services are needed). Other practitioners are experimenting with
private practice arrangements that offer sliding-scale services to middle-income
persons. See Louise G. Trubek, The Worst of Times... And the Best of Times:
Lawyeringfor Poor Clients Today, 22 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1123,1126 (1995); Trubek &
Kransberger, supra note 38, at 203-16 (describing various lawyers in private practices
aimed at providing services to "disadvantaged individuals and groups"). A Los
Angeles coffee house, the "Legal Grind," offers customers a cup of espresso and a
fifteen minute consultation with an attorney for twenty dollars. Its founder aims the
service at middle-income people who do not qualify for free legal aid but lack the
income to pay lawyers' regular fees. Individuals needing additional assistance receive
referrals to lawyers willing to take their cases for a set fee, contingency fee, or no fee.
See Bob Pool, Coffee and a Living Will, Please, L.A. Times, Feb. 17, 2001, at B5; see
also American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Delivery of Legal
Services, Innovative Programs to Help People of Modest Means Obtain Legal Help,
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/delmodesthelp.html (last visited Aug.
20, 2001) (listing many other innovative programs designed to make legal services
more readily available to people of average means).
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1. The Early Twentieth Century
One illuminating examination of early twentieth century ideas
about public interest law is Clyde Spillenger's research on Louis
Brandeis, whose many pro bono legal undertakings prior to his
appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court mark him as one of the
nation's most important early "public interest" lawyers.' Spillenger
explores Brandeis's approach to his "public interest" cases and shows
that Brandeis equated pro bono representation with not accepting
fees from his clients, even when they could well have afforded to
pay.45 Spillenger argues convincingly that the reason Brandeis refused
to accept fees in these cases was his view that not accepting fees
liberated him from his clients' interests and allowed him to advance
his own views of what the public interest entailed.' Spillenger
critiques Brandeis's desire for such independence:
There was a downside to Brandeis's independent and directive
approach to lawyering-an unwillingness to submit to the discipline
of engagement with others (in particular, "clients") that the act of
representation necessarily imposes.... But the question of how,
indeed if, one is to act in concert with others in such a world
complicates the choice of Brandeis as a model for lawyering. In any
relational context-and the realms of politics and lawyTer-client
interaction obviously qualify as such-one person's "freedom" or
"autonomy" can come at a sacrifice of the power that others are able
to assert.
4 -
In prior research I have explored some of the historical dimensions
of the development of our present conceptions of "public interest"
practice. I briefly summarize some of that research here, because it so
heavily influences my argument calling for rethinking the social value
we assign to lawyering for under-represented interests in private
practice situations.
In a two-part project, I investigated the interface between legal
ethics rules and the early legal work of the NAACP. One article
examined how this work consisted of a mix of contributions from
African-American lawyers, who pioneered new case litigation
strategies in local communities around the country, and elite, mostly
white lawyers sitting on the NAACP's first national legal committee,
who attempted to coordinate and build upon those grassroots
experiments to push forward a national civil rights litigation agenda.'
44. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's
Lawyer, 105 Yale L. J. 1445 (1996).
45. Id at 1477-78.
46. Id. at 1479.
47. Id. at 1449.
48. Susan D. Carte, Race Class and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-19201.
20 Law & Hist. Rev. 97 (forthcoming 2002) (text available in pre-print form at
http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journalsflhr.html (scroll to "Forthcoming").
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This arrangement was, needless to say, fraught with many tensions
over matters including control of cases and strategy, fund raising and
finances, questions about race discrimination against African-
American lawyers in the courts and within the NAACP, and issues
related to African-American versus white control over an
organization dedicated to advancing the cause of African-American
civil rights.
One of the most interesting tensions was between the practice
settings and orientations of the African-American lawyers in local
communities and elite white lawyers affiliated with the national office.
The African-American lawyers typically ran legal practices consisting
of a mix of paid work for individuals and African-American
businesses and fraternal organizations and cases testing and
promoting key civil rights issues, for which they might or might not
receive fees. The white lawyers on the national legal committee, on
the other hand, came from elite New York City law practices and saw
their work for the NAACP as a pro bono service contribution. Like
Brandeis, these elite white lawyers defined "public interest" work as
work for which lawyers received no legal fees. The African-American
lawyers did not share such a purist conception, because receiving
some fees for their work where possible was crucial to keeping their
practices afloat.
A second article traced the way the elite NAACP national legal
committee lawyers' conception of "public interest" work ended up
being embodied in the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence. 9 In its
decision in NAACP v. Button," the Court carved a distinction
between "public interest" litigation, in which lawyers enjoy First
Amendment protection from prosecution for certain kinds of ethics
violations, and litigation for private or pecuniary motives, in which
lawyers do not receive the constitutional protections granted to core
political activity. The Button decision gave rise to a bright line in the
U.S. Supreme Court's legal ethics jurisprudence between "public" and
"private" interest legal work. 1 But none other than Justice Marshall,
former legal director of the NAACP, wrote a concurrence in one of
49. Susan D. Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP
(Part 11), 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 281 (2001).
50. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
51. Compare Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding the
state bar's prosecution of a personal injury lawyer for having aggressively solicited
teenage clients involved in a car accident in violation of state bar rules prohibiting
lawyer solicitation), with In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (invalidating South
Carolina's prosecution, under disciplinary rules almost identical to those of Ohio, of
an ACLU lawyer who had offered her services for free to a woman who had
undergone involuntary sterilization); see also Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515
U.S. 618, 634-635 (1995) (applying lower level of First Amendment scrutiny
applicable to commercial speech to uphold constitutionality of state bar rules that
prohibited lawyers from soliciting personal injury clients by mail within thirty days of
an accident).
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these cases suggesting that the Court's approach ignored the public
interest dimensions inherent in paid legal work for clients who might
not otherwise have received legal services.- Marshall does not
mention his own experience as a public interest lawyer in his
concurrence, but it is surely telling that the Justice on the Court with
the strongest public interest background is the one who cautioned
against adopting an overly narrow conception of the "public interest"
dimension of fee-for-service lawyering for under-represented client
populations.
In yet another forum, I suggested that such an overly rigid
conception of the difference between "'public" and "private" interest
lawyering is likewise reflected in the current Model Rules' definition
of the pro bono obligation. 3 That definition defines core pro bono
work as work for no fee conducted on behalf of under-represented
persons or interests.' I argued, however, that there is no good
conceptual reason why pro bono-literally work "for the public
good"-must at its core be limited to unpaid work. Indeed, I
suggested, the very phrase "public interest" has an archaic, early
twentieth century ring. The term belongs to a period prior to the rise
of modem conceptions of interest group pluralism. Contrary to the
mind set of contemporary anti-foundationalist post-moderns, the term
appears to assume that there is a readily discernable, unitary "public
interest" to pursue through law, an idea abandoned long ago by most
lawyers about most subjects outside a limited range of fundamental
rights of political participation.
In short, my research suggests that one source of our present day
binary conception of "public" versus "private" interest law is the
historical origins of that conception in the model of elite lawyers'
limited, unpaid pro bono work. The bulk of those lawyers' time was
spent on highly paid legal work for wealthy clients. They therefore
did not have to develop-and indeed, in some ways scorned-models
of lawyers making a reasonable living in private sector practices
motivated by "public interest" commitments. There is, nevertheless, a
long history, ignored within the dominant conception of "public
interest" law, of such lawyers organizing themselves in fee-for-practice
arrangements.-5 It is a history worth reviving in order to help law
graduates formulate alternative models of sustainable practice today.
52. Ohralik. 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall. J.. concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
53. Susan Carle. Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lan-Yering: Some Historical
Reflections. 9 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 81 (2001).
54. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.1 (2001).
55. To cite just a few examples of literature exploring these practice settings in
various historical periods, see, e.g., J.L. Chestnut. Jr. & Julia Cass, Black in Selma:
The Uncommon Life of J.L. Chestnut, Jr. (1990) (recounting career of solo southern
civil rights lawyer who began law practice in the late 1950s); J. Clay Smith, Jr.,
Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer. 1844-1944 (1993) (describing civil
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2. The 1970s
Another historical source of our present conception of "public
interest" work is the 1970s poverty law movement. In a classic article
published in the Yale Law Journal, for example, poverty law
movement leaders Edgar and Jean Cahn argued strenuously against a
conception of "public interest" law that included middle-class
concerns. They asserted:
Given the current unresponsiveness of the political system to ethnic
minorities, the allocation of public interest law resources to
majoritarian, middle-class, white concerns is contrary to the public
interest. The political system can respond to these concerns without
siphoning off the limited, special and constitutionally distinctive
resources of the legal profession.5 6
Similar statements can be found throughout the Cahns' article."
Whether viewed as defining the movement's future direction or
reflecting its established path, the Cahns' position appears to have had
a profound impact on the dominant conceptions of "public interest"
law, especially in the law schools and law school clinics with which
movement leaders such as the Cahns were closely associated.
Not all leaders of the 1970s activist lawyering movement shared the
Cahns' view that lawyering for the middle class should be excluded
from the public interest lawyering umbrella. Another extremely
thoughtful piece of the same era embraced the opposite view. 8
Authored by Charles R. Halpern, then an attorney at the Center for
Law and Social Policy, this article called for a new kind of public
interest law that would be broader than traditional poverty law,
explaining:
The public interest lawyers... define their role more broadly than
the poverty lawyers. First, the public interest lawyers believe that
the poor are not the only people excluded from the decision-making
process on issues of vital importance to them. All people concerned
with environmental degradation, with product safety, with consumer
rights activities of early African-American lawyers); Aaron Porter, Norris, Schmidt,
Green, Harris, Higginbotham & Associates: The Sociolegal Import of Philadelphia
Cause Lawyers, in Cause Lawyering, supra note 35, at 151-80 (discussing cause
lawyering firm in Philadelphia).
56. Cahn & Cahn, supra note 34, at 1005.
57. See, e.g., id. at 1043 (observing that "'racism by inadvertence'.. . now takes its
most ironic form in the new crusade over pollution"); id. at 1044 ("At a time when the
political system has become less responsive, if not outright hostile, to the grievances
of ethnic minorities, the only profession specially protected in an advocacy role
cannot justify its dereliction by regrouping under the righteous banner of essentially
majoritarian concerns.").
58. Charles R. Halpern, Public Interest Law: Its Past and Future, 58 Judicature
118, 119 (1974). I am grateful to Professor Richard Wilson for bringing this article to
my attention and sharing with me his amazingly comprehensive course materials for a
seminar entitled "Global Public Interest Law."
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protection, whatever their class, are effectively excluded from key
decisions affecting those interests. Second, the public interest
lawyers are beginning to move in an area that had only been
tangentially touched by the poverty lawyers-that domain where
corporate power shapes governmental power, where decisions
affecting large numbers of citizens are often quietly made.5
Here Halpern seems to be assuming that public interest law\yers would
organize themselves primarily into nonprofit centers such as the
Center for Law and Social Policy, noting that, even though clients
could afford to pay some fees for legal services, those fees would not
be enough to finance the kinds of broad attacks on corporate power
he was contemplating.' But he clearly recognized, writing almost
thirty years ago, the importance of developing "mixed" funding
mechanisms including a combination of foundation support, private
donations, court-awarded attorneys fees, and client fees."
Halpern's view-focusing on the similarity between middle-income
and poor people's powerlessness in the face of corporate power-is
reflected to some extent in the environmental and consumer
lawyering movements of today. 62 But it is not, for the most part,
reflected in the dominant conception of "public interest" law in the
law schools. Instead, the Cahns' view-focusing exclusively on the
needs of the poorest and most disenfranchised members of our
society-predominates. This perspective seems eminently defensible
in some contexts, especially in decisions about how law schools should
allocate the limited resources of their clinical programs. Ethically, it
makes perfect sense to devote these resources to the clients who need
them most. But it is a far less sustainable viewpoint, in my estimation,
when read as a call for how to define the kinds of lawyering we want
to honor. This is especially true today, when so few avenues for 1970s
style "public interest" lawyering exist.
The Cahns, writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, do not seem to
have been concerned about the long-term economic viability of core
poverty law practices. In today's very different economic and political
climate, fiscal realities seem much more important.' This is true for a
59. Id at 120.
60. Id. at 125.
61. Id. at 125-27.
62- See, e.g., Public Justice, Winter 2001 (newsletter of Trial Lawyers for Public
Justice describing health care, environmental, and consumer law cases).
63. A second reason for questioning the Cahns' way of thinking is that the past
thirty years have not necessarily borne out the Cahns' claim that poor and middle-
income people have fundamentally divergent legal interests. As one environmentaljustice activist diplomatically put it, the Cahns' analysis dismissing environmental
issues as too middle-class and ignoring their impact on the poor, was
"underdeveloped in 1970." Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as The Key to
Environmental Protection: The Need For Environmental Povert Law, 19 Ecology
L.Q. 619, 671 n.228 (1992). Reflecting the continuing power of the Cahns' analysis.
however, Cole hastens to add the following disclaimer: "Nothing in this article should
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host of reasons. First, there are far too few traditional "public
interest" jobs to go around. The latest employment statistics report
that one percent of U.S. lawyers hold legal aid and public defender
positions, down from two percent in 1980. The figures for recent law
graduates are little better. The National Association for Law
Placement reports that fewer than three percent of graduating law
students in the class of 2000 went into "public interest" employment.'
Second, a number of complex variables skew law students' career
decisions away from traditional "public interest" law. Among such
factors are value changes many students undergo as a result of
professional socialization.' Another factor is the soaring cost of law
school education, so that students today often graduate with
educational debt many times greater than they did thirty years ago."
be taken as a call to focus further legal or other attention on white, middle-class
concerns." Id. The research and survey results I have cited above suggest that the
Cahns' optimism that the political enfranchisement of middle-income Americans
would protect their legal interests may have been too rosy. See supra Part I.B.
Despite politicians' pandering to middle-class interests at election time, in many
respects majoritarian political processes do not appear to have worked to the benefit
of middle-income Americans, especially where their interests collide with the those of
the wealthy and powerful. Defending this proposition would obviously take me far
beyond the scope of this Article, but it bears mentioning that the mere existence of a
democratic political system does not mean that the legal system will work in the
majority's interests.
64. Carson, supra note 8, at 10.
65. National Association for Law Placement, supra note 37, at 13, 109 (reporting
that 2.7% of graduating law students went into public interest employment). For this
organization's definition of public interest employment, see supra note 37.
66. Leading research concludes that the reasons for law students' abandonment of
the public interest commitment with which they enter law school include law school
socialization, changing expectations and values in evaluating career options, and
receipt of information about the job market that makes students pessimistic about
their chances of obtaining public interest positions. See, e.g., Stover, supra note 28.
There has been, in fact, a friendly ongoing debate among researchers about whether
law school socialization or legal job market factors best account for the dramatic
declines in the public interest career plans of law students as measured over the
course of their law school careers. Compare Stover, supra note 28, at xix, with
Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization Effects of Professional
Schook The Law School Experience and Student Orientations to Public Interest
Concerns, 13 Law & Soc'y Rev. 11 (1979) (arguing that job market, not law school
socialization, is the most important factor causing students to turn away from public
interest careers); see also Robert Granfield, Constructing Professional Boundaries in
Law School: Reactions of Students and Implications for Teachers, 4 S. Cal. Rev. L. &
Women's Stud. 53, 74 (1994) ("One of the most common accounts offered by students
for not taking public interest jobs was that they had exorbitant loans to pay back.").
67. In the decade between 1987 and 1997 alone, the cost of law school tuition more
than doubled for both public and private schools. National Association of Public
Interest Law, Financing the Future 9 (2000), available at http://www.napil.org/SUB-
SO/Report2000/REPORTEXEC-FM.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2001) (providing
tuition figures). In 1997, the cost of law school tuition alone for private schools was
$19,256, id. at 9, and tuition has only continued to rise since then. According to
Access Group, a non-profit organization providing financing to graduate students and
the leading provider of private law school loans, the median amount of total loans for
law students in the class of 1998 was almost $70.000: thus. half of those law students
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On top of this, the gap between starting salaries in "public interest"
and corporate law jobs has increased by a factor of ten since the 1970s:
whereas in the 1970s an approximately 40% pay differential separated
entry level legal services jobs from jobs in law firms ($25,000 versus
$35,000), in the 1990s, this difference was closer to 300% ($35,000
versus $140,000). 6
Whatever the reasons for the minuscule number of "public interest"
lawyers, I fear that we are doing a disservice to our students, and to
society more broadly, by allowing a narrow conception of "public
interest" law to shape law school programs, such as career planning
and externship programs, designed to help students find viable
practice options after graduation. It is simply impractical to tell law
students that doing socially valuable work requires getting a job in the
public or nonprofit sector, a goal that fewer than 3% will attain.
While I wholeheartedly agree that it would be better to send our law
school graduates into poverty law practices, in reality that is not where
the jobs are, or where they are likely to be in the foreseeable future.
Nor is there any principled reason why lawyering in fee-for-service
arrangements-i.e., in the private sector, where 74% of all lawyers
work-necessarily clashes with our contemporary pluralistic
understanding of the social benefits of "under-representation"
lawyering.69 To be sure, lawyers who represent poor people do not
take fees from their clients, but this is because their clients cannot
afford to pay.7" The fact that traditional poverty law programs take no
graduated with debt burdens higher than $70,000 in 1998. See Access Group
Memorandum, Aug. 29,2000 (on file with author).
68. Richard Abel, Evahating a Public Interest Scholars Program (Apr. 21, 20I)
(unpublished manuscript presented at panel discussion entitled Public Interest Law in
Comparative Perspective, held at American University Washington College of Law,
on file with author).
69. Trubek and Kransberger offer the following historical insight into the origins
of the public interest law tenet that client representation should take place solely in
nonprofit organizational forms:
To develop.., new institutions and jobs and obtain the financial support
they required, the founders [of the public interest lawyering movement of
the 1960s and 1970s] stressed the unique capabilities of the public interest
bar: they argued that the nonprofit structure, supported by public and
private gifts and grants of law school budgets, was essential for effective
lawyering for social change. To gain status in the legal profession and secure
jobs, they claimed, only full-time specialists in nonprofit settings could do
the job.
As a result of the legal services and public interest professionalism
project, the potential contribution of private practitioners to social change
lawyering was devalued: in order to argue for separate, publicly supported
practice settings, the social mission of the private sphere was downplayed.
Thus, the two separate spheres of public interest law and private practice
emerged.
Trubek & Kransberger, supra note 38, at 202.
70. The U.S. Census Bureau defines the poverty line based on the level at which a
family's income is no longer sufficient to purchase food for a nutritionally adequate
diet (a definition that has itself been criticized as failing to account for the rising share
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fees from clients does not explain why conceptions of "public interest"
law today should exclude from their rubric all fee-for-service forms of
practice- including, most significantly for our purposes, lawyering for
middle-income clients in practice settings that depend all or in part on
charging modest client fees.
III. A NEW ALTERNATIVE HIERARCHY
If the issue presented is how might we re-envision our conception of
social honor in law so as to avoid the trap of binary thinking contained
in the "public" versus "private" interest dichotomy, it seems to me
that we should develop and promote an alternative model of honor in
practice that does not rest on a public/private distinction. I sketch one
very preliminary approach to this challenge here.
My proposal begins with the assertion that it is misleading to
encourage students to think about their career choices in terms of a
simplistic "public" versus "private" interest dichotomy. As William
H. Simon and others have shown convincingly, there is no such thing
as pure "public interest" practice. Even in core "public interest" jobs,
lawyers struggle with the unavoidable problem of inadvertently
imposing their own ideas and interests over the desires and self-
defined interests of their clients. 71 Thus, no responsible ethics teacher,
to my mind, leaves unchallenged some progressive law students'
tendencies to think of "public interest" work as ethically "pure."
Students should appreciate that all lawyers face difficult moral
dilemmas.7 Along with this awareness comes a more nuanced sense
of family expenditures on housing and child care and shrinking portion of family
budgets spent on food). See Kathryn Porter, Proposed Changes in the Official
Measure of Poverty, at http://www.cbpp.org/ll-15-99wel.htm (last visited Aug. 14,
2001). At this less-than-subsistence level, people obviously can spend nothing on
legal services. For this reason, legal services programs for the poor, which typically
set their eligibility requirements at 125% of the poverty level, quite appropriately do
not charge even modest client fees.
71. See William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment
on Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1099, 1102 (1994) ("The dark secret of progressive lawyering is that lawyers
cannot avoid making judgments in terms of their own values and influencing their
clients to adopt those judgments.").
72. These potential ethical problems in public interest law include, not only
lawyer blindness to or inadvertent domination of clients' wishes, but a host of
potential conflict of interest problems, such as those among client groups, between
client interests and those of non-client groups or the "public interest" more broadly,
between clients and funding organizations' interests, and between clients' and
lawyers' personal interests and convictions. See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 41; Peter
Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of Interest
and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 2339 (1999):
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183 (1982);
William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: Addressing Disputes Among Group
Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L.J. 1623 (1997); White,
supra note 42.
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of the balancing of ethical considerations involved in all practice
options.
Simon offers his proposal for incorporating an alternative ethical
vision into law practice in his book, The Practice of Justice where he
builds from his important critical insights that all lawyering involves a
mix of public and private interest considerations to construct an
affirmative platform that calls on lawyers to explicitly incorporate
public interest considerations into all client representations. Thus
Simon would have lawyers calibrate their actions in representing their
clients so that "considering the relevant circumstances of the
particular case, [those actions] seem likely to promote justice."'74
Simon's argument that lawyers should seek to further the "public
interest" over the interests and expressed desires of their clients has
been, needless to say, an extremely controversial proposition.' For
one, this idea conflicts with our pluralistic notion that no one class in
society-including lawyers-has a special ability to discern what "'the
public interest" is. I have found it impossible to sell Simon's
affirmative model (though not his critical insights) to my students.
Indeed, the longer I teach legal ethics, the more convinced I become
that the "a-ha" moment in the socialization of law students from lay
persons to ethical lawyers occurs when students first truly grasp the
meaning of lawyers' obligations of fidelity and loyalty to their clients.
The idea that a lawyer, once having agreed to accept a client
representation, must be a zealous advocate for her client regardless of
her own conflicting personal or political convictions is far too deeply
embedded in our conceptions of lawyers' role morality to be dislodged
easily. It is this conception of lawyers' role morality that leads us, for
example, to hold up for honor (correctly, I think) la%%-yers who
champion the unpopular causes of powerless and despised clients such
as indigent criminal defendants.76
It thus seems to me that there is something amiss in Simon's
proposal that lawyers should go to work for whatever clients they
please, but then attempt in their representations to ensure that their
clients adhere to what the "public interest" dictates. Far better, in my
73. William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice (1998).
74. Id. at 138. For some history on the background of the "duty to do justice"
view, see Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of
the 1908 Canons, 24 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1 (1999).
75. For leading critiques of Simon's proposals. see Review Essay Symposium: The
Practice of Justice by William H. Simon, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 867 (1999).
76. One such recent example is Professor Michael Tigar's defense of Terry
Nichols, Timothy McVeigh's accomplice in the bombing of the federal building in
Oklahoma City that killed or maimed scores of innocent individuals, including
children attending day care in the building. Tigar's brilliant defense of Nichols. saving
him from the death penalty, epitomizes the moral honor involved in a lawyer serving
as a zealous advocate on behalf of a powerless. despised client. See Michael E. Tigar.
Persuasion: The Litigator's Art passim (1999) (describing strategy in representing
Nichols and strategies lawyers use for representing unpopular clients generally).
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view, would be to place more emphasis on the choice of practice
setting as an important point of moral decisionmaking. 77 We should,
in other words, as one speaker helpfully urged my students last spring,
promote a vision of ethical law practice that encourages students to
make career decisions based on an evaluation of the overall moral
tenor of their chosen paths in the law.
A key aspect of evaluating career options in this way is choosing
what type of client base to represent. Thus, my proposal would be as
follows: we as legal ethics teachers and theorists should urge our
students to conceive of their career options as falling on a spectrum,
along which the moral honor in representing a particular client base
will tend to be inversely related to the social, political, and economic
power of those clients.7 8 This proposal explains why "the best"-or
most ethical and admirable-lawyers would work with unmitigated
zealousness for less powerful clients against more powerful ones.
There is, according to this model, generally more honor in
representing less powerful clients than in representing more powerful
ones, especially when representing less powerful clients' interests
against the interests of the more powerful. This accounts, for
example, for our ethical sense that defending an indigent murderer is
"public interest" work, while defending a corporate executive from
criminal wrongdoing is not.
Admittedly, there are potential problems with my proposal that
cannot be fully worked out in this brief Article.79 To take one
77. I have sometimes puzzled about why legal ethics scholars such as Simon do
not focus more on the ethical choices involved in selecting a practice setting. Here I
think an ethicist such as Simon, teaching as he does in one of the country's elite law
schools (Stanford), might forthrightly recognize that (unfortunately, to his mind) an
overwhelming number of his students go into corporate law practices. He and others
appear to be thinking, either consciously or unconsciously, about how to reach their
own student base. But statistics show, as discussed above, that the majority of lawyers
do not go into large firm corporate law practices, and even in elite law schools a
sizable group of students yearn (or used to, anyway) for practice experiences
motivated by commitments more engaging than receiving fat paychecks.
78. Colleagues who read earlier drafts of this Article pointed out that my
formulation leaves out pro bono work for large law firms and may overemphasize the
value to the public interest of the work many smaller law firms perform. I intend,
however, to offer this provocative suggestion: that there may be more value in
working for middle-income clients in a small firm setting than in doing even
significant amounts of pro bono work in a corporate law firm whose pro bono projects
are sustained by the fees of enormously wealthy and powerful clients whose interests
dictate the types of pro bono work the firm will accept.
79. My proposal does not, for example, easily encompass government lawyers,
who (in theory at least) are representing "the People's" interests. Government
lawyers may in some situations vastly overpower their adversaries, while in other
situations government lawyers may have far fewer resources than their opponents, as
in the recent Microsoft antitrust litigation. See Joel Brinkley & Steve Lohr, U.S. v.
Microsoft 328 (2001) (quoting comment of lead trial counsel for the United States
David Boies that "[t]he government has some power, but Microsoft has at least as
much"); John Heilemann, Pride Before the Fall: The Trials of Bill Gates and the End
of the Microsoft Era 122 (noting that Microsoft General Counsel Bill Neukom
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example, my proposal may not neatly classify some "cause" lawyers
whose "clients" are amorphous or not easily categorized by economic
class, such as the National Abortion Rights Action League and the
National Right to Life Committee. But the fact that not all lawyering
arrangements fit neatly within my model does not detract from its
usefulness in reconceptualizing an important category of lawyer-client
relationships. Most important for purposes of this Article are the
benefits to both law students and middle-income clients of a sliding-
scale lawyering model in which honor and esteem rise as the
socioeconomic and political clout of one's client base falls. My model
creates far broader opportunities for students to find practice settings
that would allow them to give life to the ethical commitments that
drew them to the practice of law as a way of achieving ends more
valuable than perpetuating the interests of the powerful and wealthy.
I realize that my very preliminary and intentionally provocative
proposal for reconfiguring our conceptions of the moral honor
involved in different practice settings is likely to meet many
objections. Before concluding I address a few of the most obvious.
First is the argument that it is simply impossible to disrupt the current
status hierarchy that grants the highest prestige to corporate law jobs.
To some extent this is true. As theorists have shown so persuasively,
the processes that produce social hierarchies are extremely resistant to
purposive manipulation.' But the evidence also indicates that these
entrenched hierarchies are currently in flux, and thus suggest
possibilities for productive intervention.
In a recently published article, Heinz and Laumann, the same
sociologists who originally developed the two hemispheres concept to
describe the legal profession's status hierarchy," modified their
conclusions somewhat based on the results of a 1995 survey. Joined
by several other leading legal sociologists, Heinz and Laumann
reported that the new data did not support their thesis of two sharply
divided spheres of corporate and personal services practice as starkly
as their data from the 1970s had.' They attributed the difference in
part to improvements in their data collection methods.' - But Heinz
and Laumann also concluded that the differences in their survey
results over the span of two decades captured significant changes in
the profession. Most significant was a trend towards increasing
"presided over a squadron of lawyers three times the size of the DOJ's").
80. Bourdieu shows how social classes battle for resources using cultural images.
See generally Bourdieu, supra note 2 (demonstrating the deep and tenacious hold of
class hierarchies generally). Similarly, Abel's work on monopoly theory and the legal
profession shows how insider groups work to form prestige ideas that exclude
outsider groups. See Abel, supra note 10, at 112-26.
81. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
82. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in
1975 and 1995,32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 751 (1998).
83. Id. at 754-55.
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specialization: lawyers are now subdivided into smaller, more
specialized clusters of practice areas less clearly separated by the
broad distinction between corporate and personal client types. 4 They
also reported that, overall, their data were "less orderly" and "more
unstable" than in 1975.85
The results of the latest Heinz and Laumann survey showing the
profession in a period of instability are consistent with the findings of
other leading researchers who have been studying developments in
the profession, especially changes resulting from the influx of large
numbers of women and other traditional outsiders.86 Some evidence
suggests, for example, that women lawyers tend to have somewhat
different priorities in balancing work versus family and the prestige
against the "social worth" of a job,87 suggesting possible pressure
points for further change in the structure of legal work. Although it is
far from certain what, if any, progress will result from such pressure,
the evidence depicts a profession in a period of increasing change, in
turn suggesting opportunities for shaking up its entrenched status
hierarchies.
I do not mean to be presenting a naive argument that we as law
professors have the power to transform the legal profession's
hierarchy. Powerful forces-including huge differentials in financial
compensation-uphold it, and similar hierarchies are evident in other
professions.' My proposal does not depend, however, on changing
the dominant prestige hierarchy, but only on intervening in the
construction of the alternative one currently conceived of as "public
interest" practice. Here I draw from ideas Professor Richard Abel
presented at a talk he gave at American University last spring. Abel,
84. They found that lawyers working in specialties dealing with personal problems
of individuals-such as divorce, employment, general family practice, and personal
injury-tended to have fewer business clients than lawyers specializing in fields of law
needed by individuals with more money-such as probate and residential real estate.
Id. at 758-59. In the latter fields, lawyers are now more likely to represent both
wealthy individuals and businesses. Id. at 764.
85. Id. at 760.
86. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the
Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 621 (1994) (discussing potential implications of influx of women
in law and research suggesting that women's balancing of prestige/money versus social
worth of jobs may tend to be different than men's); Nelson, supra note 8, at 359-65,
374-80 (discussing demographic changes in gender and racial makeup of the
profession). Recent figures showing that more women than men are now applying to
law school suggest that this feminization of the legal profession is likely to continue.
See, e.g., Ted Gest, Law Schools' New Female Face, U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 9,
2001, at 76.
87. See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, supra note 86 (examining implications of women's
potentially different value structures); Stover, supra note 28, at xxii (measuring
significantly higher interest in professional altruism among women than men).
88. Thus it is more prestigious in medicine to work at a teaching hospital than a
medical clinic, as it is in accounting to work for one of the "big eight" firms than to do
individual tax returns for H&R Block.
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himself a poverty lawyer in the 1970s, noted that in the heyday of the
"public interest" law movement of the 1970s, becoming a "public
interest" lawyer was considered a high prestige alternative to entering
a law firm. Programs such as the highly competitive Reginald Heber
Smith ("Reggie") scholarships helped to support these alternative
notions of prestige.' Abel suggests that the construction of such
alternative prestige structures should likewise be an important
consideration in the design of "public interest" law scholarship
programs today.9
Abel's insight seems to me an extremely important one. While it is
unrealistic to think that the dominant mentality in the legal profession
will change to one in which representing individuals is more
prestigious than representing corporations, it seems far more feasible
to imagine intervening in the creation of alternative hierarchies that
assign prestige to helping real people with real problems and making a
real difference in their lives. That hierarchy, I am arguing, should
assign value-and hence prestige-to lawyering for middle-income
clients.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the success of my proposal does not depend on all law
students, or even many law students, adopting the value structure I am
proposing here. Just as in the creation of an alternative elite for core
"public interest" practice, the plan need only reach a small minority of
law students to make a difference. It would not target students whose
political interests or intellectual tastes lead them to find corporate law
practice appealing. The group it would target is that subset of
students who come to law school with a strong commitment to helping
improve people's lives through law, but who cannot find sustainable
"public interest" employment after graduation. My alternative
conception of honor would say to those students: if you find yourself
unable, for whatever combination of reasons, to secure core "public
interest" employment, consider the alternatives available in the vast
spectrum of private sector opportunities that lie between core "public
interest" work and work for corporate law firms, consider finding
interesting, morally sustainable practices that present opportunities to
provide legal services to the less powerful, in whatever kinds of
struggles you find most intriguing, rather than opting to represent the
interests of the wealthy.
89. See Abel, supra note 68; see also Stover, supra note 28. at 115 (arguing that
there is a need for "subcultural support" for students interested in -public interest"
law).
90. Such "public interest" scholars programs have been instituted in a number of
law schools across the country, including American University, Fordham, and UCLA.
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This approach would help students avoid feeling trapped in an all or
nothing world, by illuminating the wide array of possible choices and
balances to be struck in finding morally sustainable practice settings.
It might also, coincidentally, help to mitigate the apparently growing
problems in the provision of high quality legal services to middle-
income persons.
